The Sixth Circuit affirms a $350,000 jury award for a police officer who was transferred far from her home, in retaliation for complaining about sex harassment. The court rejects a bid by the department to reduce the award, finding that the jury's calculations of back and front pay - and award of compensatory damages for pain and suffering - are supported by the record.
Penn v. New York Methodist Hospital, No. 16-474 (2d Cir., Mar. 7, 2018); EEOC v. R.G. &. G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, No. 16-2424 (6th Cir. Mar. 7, 2018)
This week, two U.S. Courts of Appeals publish decisions about whether religiously-oriented employers were exempt from Title VII owing to alleged religious-liberty rights: a Methodist hospital wins in the Second Circuit, while a funeral home loses in the Sixth Circuit.
Pittington v. Great Smoky Mountain Lumberjack Feud, LLC, No. 17-5590 (6th Cir. Jan. 24, 2018)
The Sixth Circuit, in a split decision, remands a Title VII retaliation case for a new trial on back pay, and reconsideration of prejudgment interest - holding that the winning plaintiff was conclusively entitled to a greater recovery. It's a reminder to lawyers: whether you're trying a back-pay claim to a jury (as in this case) or to a judge, make sure to offer W-2s or other evidence to substantiate the amount, and to argue methodically for prejudgment interest.
Tabura v. Kellogg USA, No. 16-4135 (10th Cir. Jan. 17, 2018)
The Tenth Circuit reverses summary judgment in a Title VII religious accommodation case, holding that a jury must decide both (1) whether the employer offered a reasonable accommodation to two Seventh Day Adventist employees who could not work Friday nights or Saturdays, by allowing them to swap shifts with willing co-workers; and (2) whether further accommodating their Sabbath observance would cause undue hardship.
Lewis v. City of Union City, Ga., No. 15-11362 (11th Cir. Dec. 15, 2017)
In the ceaseless struggle over what is meant by "similarly situated," an Eleventh Circuit splits over whether the plaintiff - a Black woman detective with a heart condition - presented enough evidence that two white male officers who failed a physical-fitness requirement were treated better. The case also considers, for an ADA claim, whether receiving a Taser shock or pepper spraying in training was an "essential function" of the job.
Clemens v. Qwest Corp., No. 15-35160 (9th Cir Nov. 3, 2017)
The Ninth Circuit becomes the fourth court of appeals to recognize tax gross-up awards to successful Title VII plaintiff, which recognize (and compensate for) the tax penalty that plaintiff suffer when they receive lump sums of back pay in a single tax year.
Hicks v. City of Tuscaloosa, Ala., No. 16-13003 (11th Cir. Sept. 7, 2017)
In a potentially important development for family-responsibilities discrimination law, the Eleventh Circuit upholds a $161,319.92 award for a woman who was forced to quit police work because the city would not accommodate her breastfeeding.
Moody v. Atlantic City Bd. of Educ., No. 16-4373 (3d Cir. Sept. 6, 2017)
The Third Circuit holds, in a 2-1 decision, that an individual may be a "supervisor" for purposes of imputing liability to the employer vicariously for sex harassment if they are "tasked with creating a work schedule" for their subordinates.
McKinney v. Sheriff's Office of Whitley Co., No. 16-4131 (7th Cir. Aug. 8, 2017)
The Seventh Circuit reverses and remands a Title VII claim for trial that it describes as a potentially "strong case of race discrimination." In particular, it reminds district courts that the "same actor" inference - that a manager who hires Black employees is unlikely to be biased against them - is at most an argument for trial, not a rule for deciding summary judgment.
Alamo v. Bliss, No. 15-2849 (7th Cir. July 20, 2017)
The Seventh Circuit decides a couple of useful things in this Title VII and § 1983 national-origin discrimination, harassment, and retaliation case, set in a City of Chicago firehouse. First, it holds that even petty activity such as lunch-stealing may constitute part of a hostile work environment when the entire pattern of conduct is considered together. Second, even such tedious activities as constantly shifting an employee from site to site, and intensively challenging fitness for duty after medical leave, may constitute materially adverse employment actions.
