A common scenario in employment cases is the manager or supervisor who overreacts to a blow-up at work by firing the employee. What the employer may deem as a measured response to insubordination can, after the fact, be held by a court or jury to be the culmination of unlawful discrimination or retaliation. In this case, the First Circuit returns just such a case for a trial, reversing summary judgment entered against a nurse who was fired after complaining that she was being worked beyond her restrictions.
In this ADEA case, the Eleventh Circuit affirms the simple truth under employment discrimination law that when the decision-maker later (reportedly) disavows the very reasons that the employer gives for firing an employee, this circumstance presents a witness credibility issue that cannot be decided on paper alone, and only a jury can properly resolve.
The Seventh Circuit, per Judge Richard Posner, reminds the lower courts once again that private-sector employees do not have an administrative "exhaustion" requirement under Title VII, and that disputed issues of fact about limitations periods belong to a jury, not the judge.
An employee with a 31-year history is fired at age 56 for allegedly failing to maintain sanitary conditions in a pharmaceutical plant, and sues for age discrimination under the ADEA in Puerto Rico law. Reversing summary judgment, the First Circuit finds relevant events that occurred after the employee was fired, particularly that his 34-year-old replacement was not fired after similar violations - including "a string of incidents occurred in which animals, including numerous insects, a lizard, and rats, entered the plant."
The Sixth Circuit returns a Title VII case for trial, concerning claims that the City of Toledo discriminated against an African-American manager in work assignments, pay and evaluations, and also retaliated against him because he assisted another employee in complaining to the city about race discrimination. The panel holds that the district court applied too strict a standard at the pre-trial stage of the case, demanding proof that the "real" reason for the adverse actions was race discrimination. It also holds that at trial on the retaliation claim, the district court erred by excluding evidence of "other acts" targeting co-workers for the same activities.
The same panel on the Sixth Circuit publishes two opinions on the same day reversing summary judgment. In the first, a gaming floor supervisor revives a case against a casino for selectively enforcing a workrule about bad deals, owing (allegedly) to race and sex. In the second, the court reminds the lower court that the Americans with Disabilities Act is special because - in contrast to There statutes - it specifically protects against discrimination in training.
The Sixth Circuit applies the Supreme Court's recent decision in Staub v. Proctor Hospital, 131 S. Ct. 1186 (2011), to reverse summary judgment in a racially-discriminatory discipline case under Title VII. Echoing another Sixth Circuit decision (Madden v. Chattanooga City Wide Service Dept., 549 F.3d 666, 104 FEP 1473 (6th Cir. 2008)), it holds that an employer that punishes African-Americans who engage in horseplay in the workplace more severely than whites who commit the same infraction are flirting with Title VII liability.
When did the Eleventh Circuit suddenly become one of the most progressive circuits in the country on employment discrimination? In the past several months, the court has issued several excellent decisions enforcing civil rights, and this latest - reversing summary judgment in a race harassment case - has the potential of helping many more such claimants by setting a reasonable bar for proving severity.
An employer who fires an employee expressly because she became pregnant before marrying the father obviously violates the federal Pregnancy Discrimination Act. And it did not help the employer, in this case, that it asserted the "ministerial exception," as recently declared in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical LuTherean Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S.Ct. 694, 706 (2012).
The Second Circuit issues in important decision today in the fields of Title VII sex harassment and retaliation. The panel affirms a jury verdict of $5200 for a Title VII and New York state law hostile work environment claim, holding that the employer cannot raise a defense under Faragher/Ellerth when the harasser is also a senior executive "alter ego" of the employer. But the panel also affirms dismissal of a Title VII retaliation claim, for an HR executive engaged in an internal investigation of the harassment, holding that the "participation" clause does not cover an internal investigation of a complaint of discrimination before an EEOC charge is filed.