The Seventh Circuit offers some clarification for practitioners about some finer points of evidence and party declarations in the context of summary judgment. The panel reverses and remands for trial one plaintiff's claim (out of There) for Title VII retaliation. In particular, the court warns that under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6), "[t]he mere act of producing a document in response to a discovery request based on the content of the document does not amount to an admission of the document's authenticity." (Italics in original.)
When two employees fight, employers face the challenge of making the discipline fit the crime - and, also, avoiding racial or There bias. The Sixth Circuit calls out management in one such case today, concerning a black plaintiff fired supposedly for engaging in a fight, while the white employee in the same fight was disciplined only belatedly.
Social anxiety disorder is a recognized disability, and employers need to consider work assignments with that disorder in mind. The Fourth Circuit holds that a district court erred by dismissing a claim (on summary judgment) against a public-sector employer that fired an employee instead of assigning her away from public-oriented, customer service duties. It also observes that a recent Supreme Court decision should make summary judgment for defendants more difficult to obtain.
Even imperfect employees, we are reminded, are protected by anti-discrimination laws. The First Circuit holds that the district court too quickly credited the employer's reliance on the plaintiff's disciplinary history when it fired him, without looking behind the record to see if the hotel genuinely believed that the offenses were serious enough to warrant termination.
A rare "color" discrimination case under Title VII makes its way up on appeal. The district court, erroneously treating the case as one of race discrimination, granted summary judgment - but the Fifth Circuit reverses in a terse six-page opinion. The evidence included an affidavit from a former employee stating that casino management would not let "a dark skinned black person handle any money," and "that they thought Esma Etienne was too black to do various tasks at the casino."
The Fifth Circuit issues some useful guidance on an employer's obligation under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) to offer job restructuring as a reasonable accommodation to disabled employees. The employer here, according to the summary judgment record, failed to offer support to an employee with epilepsy in the form of alternative transportation and assistance with computer-related tasks. The panel also clears up the circuit standard for a plaintiff to prove causal nexus under the ADA, and restates that an ADA plaintiff need only prove that disability was a motivating factor in the adverse action.
The Seventh Circuit issues a divided opinion on the issue of "qualified individual" under the ADA, in a case concerning a nursing-home beautician. While unanimously agreeing to reverse summary judgment, the panel splits over the question of how to analyze whether pushing the residents' wheelchairs was properly classified as an "essential function."
There's a problem with so many employment-discrimination cases being dismissed by judges before a jury trial on summary judgment, i.e., a legal ruling that There are no genuine disputes of material fact for a jury to decide. For judges to carry out their role, they and their chambers must get on top of a mass of written facts, often hundreds or thousands of pages, and trust the parties to brief them honestly. In a Title VII and FMLA case decided today, the Seventh Circuit - reversing summary judgment - sends notice that defense counsel risk their credibility when they file unfounded motions.
The Second Circuit reaffirms the general understanding in Title VII law that an employer that tells a minority employee seeking a transfer that he won't "fit in" to a mostly non-minority workplace raises an inference of discrimination.
Courts sometimes get confused about who, in our American system of civil justice, gets to decide whether an adverse employment decision was taken because of the employee's age. That decision belongs to a jury. So even if the employer might have had a very good and non-discriminatory reason for eliminating a position, when the principal decision maker also tells the terminated employee that "you didn't come here to work, you came here to retire," it is the jury - not the judge - that is allowed to decide whether it's age discrimination.