One of the most memorable hostile-work-environment facts encountered in a recent published federal opinion: The manager - who has a history of physically threatening the plaintiff - rips off his shirt at work and tells the employee, "You don't know who you are talking to. See these scars. I was shot and was in jail." The Fifth Circuit reverses summary judgment in an ADEA and Title VII harassment case.
Eaton v. Indiana Department of Corrections, No. 10-3214 (7th Cir. Sept. 9, 2011)
For the second time in two weeks, the Seventh Circuit reverses summary judgment in a Title VII case where the employee alleged discriminatory discipline. The court finds that similar, if not identical, disciplinary violations were comparable enough to make out a prima facie case of discrimination. The court also reminds us of a simple, though easily-overlooked, principle: that a factual distinction proffered to defeat a "similarly situated" holding at the prima facie stage is immaterial if there is no evidence that the employer actually relied on that reason at the time decisions were made.
Perez-Cordero v. Wal-mart Puerto Rico, Inc., No. 09-2317 (1st Cir. Aug. 26, 2011)
The management decision in this case not to separate an employee with a sex-harassment complaint from the alleged harasser (who was also the employee's supervisor) puts the employer in a vice - it now faces a trial for both sex harassment and retaliatory harassment under Title VII and Puerto Rican law. The First Circuit specifically recognizes that a supervisor who ratchets up work and otherwise intensifies harassment against an employee for refusing to yield to sexual demands may create a new claim for retaliation.
Diaz v. Kraft Foods Global, Inc., No. 10-3073 (7th Cir. Aug. 8, 2011)
A timely reminder from the Seventh Circuit that There is no "bottom-line" defense to Title VII (Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982)): an employer does not earn immunity from Title VII liability by pointing to minority employees whom it did not treat as shabbily.
Okoli v. City of Baltimore, No. 08-2198 (4th Cir. Aug. 8, 2011)
We don't see too many published Title VII appeals concerning quid pro quo/"tangible employment action" sex harassment - claims that a harasser used his supervisory authority to punish the employee in some way for not submitting to demands for sex - but the Fourth Circuit issued such a decision yesterday. On slightly different reasoning, the panel majority and concurring judge agree that the case should be remanded for a trial on that theory, as well as straight hostile-work-environment and retaliation claims.
Benuzzi v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, No. 10-3021 (7th Cir. July 21, 2011)
Why on earth would an employer defending a federal Title VII sex discrimination lawsuit wait until the day after the plaintiff sits for her deposition to serve her with a Notice of Disciplinary Action, referring to events going back four months? The Seventh Circuit finds direct evidence that this adverse action was motivated by retaliation, reverses summary judgment and sends the plaintiff's retaliation claim back for a trial.
Smith v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., No. 09-15428 (11th Cir. June 30, 2011)
An employer can have the best anti-harassment policy that money can buy, at least on paper, but if it enforces the policy unevenly, the result can be even more legal trouble.
Williams v. CSX Transportation Company, Inc., No. 09-5564 (6th Cir. June 28. 2011)
An EEOC charge, the essential first step to filing a Title VII (or ADEA or ADA) case, must characteristically include the basic information that makes up the employee's allegations against the employer. Regrettably, many employees stumble at this stage because they do not have an attorney. But a panel of the Sixth Circuit, dividing 2-1, holds that a bare-bones charge and accompanying "charge information form" was sufficient.
Pye v. Nu Aire, Inc., No. 10-2243 (8th Cir. June 17, 2011); Geleta v. Gray, No. 10-7026 (D.C. Cir. June 17, 2011)
Two decisions issued today demonstrate the challenge employers face in managing claims of retaliation. If the summary judgment records in these cases are to be believed, the decision-makers were all-too-eager to announce their intention to get even with employees who made complaints of discrimination.
Torgerson v. City of Rochester, Minn., No. 09-1131 (8th Cir. June 1, 2011) (en banc)
A 6-5 en banc decision from the Eighth Circuit affirms summary judgment in a sex and national-origin discrimination case involving the hiring of firefighters, vacating a prior decision that reversed summary judgment. The court disaffirms language located in 62 published, panel decisions since 1987 (collected in an appendix to the opinion) stating that summary judgment ought to be applied sparingly in employment discrimination cases.
