The Third Circuit holds, in a 2-1 decision, that an individual may be a "supervisor" for purposes of imputing liability to the employer vicariously for sex harassment if they are "tasked with creating a work schedule" for their subordinates.
The Seventh Circuit reverses and remands a Title VII claim for trial that it describes as a potentially "strong case of race discrimination." In particular, it reminds district courts that the "same actor" inference - that a manager who hires Black employees is unlikely to be biased against them - is at most an argument for trial, not a rule for deciding summary judgment.
The Fifth Circuit enforces a National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") order striking down an employer's policy that banned the use of "cameras, camera phones/devices, or recording devices (audio or video) in the workplace."
The Seventh Circuit decides a couple of useful things in this Title VII and § 1983 national-origin discrimination, harassment, and retaliation case, set in a City of Chicago firehouse. First, it holds that even petty activity such as lunch-stealing may constitute part of a hostile work environment when the entire pattern of conduct is considered together. Second, even such tedious activities as constantly shifting an employee from site to site, and intensively challenging fitness for duty after medical leave, may constitute materially adverse employment actions.
The Third Circuit holds that a manager's single use of a racial slur, combined with a threat to fire a Black employee, may be enough all by itself to constitute a hostile work environment under Section 1981.
The Eighth Circuit holds that a granary employee who complained about sex discrimination in her paycheck - only to have her manager initiate her layoff literally minutes later - was entitled to have a jury decide whether she suffered retaliation under the Equal Pay Act, Title VII and the Arkansas Civil Rights Act.
Here's a timely reminder to include a prayer for nominal damages in Title VII and ADA complaints. At least in some circuits, including the Ninth, such relief is deemed equitable and thus may protect a claim from being mooted by intervening changed circumstances. That little toehold for $1.00 in damages may be the difference between outright dismissal and prevailing-party status.
The fourth Circuit affirms a jury verdict and back-pay relief of $586,860 in favor of the EEOC, in a Title VII religious accommodation case where the employer stubbornly "belie[ved] that it could rely on its own understanding of scripture to limit the scope of the accommodation it offered" an employee who, because of his Christian faith, refused to use a hand scanner.
This decision was an instant sensation in the news and social media: Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 held to protect employees from discrimination because of sexual orientation (and, presumably, gender identity as well). Digging into the majority and separate opinions, we can trace different possible outcomes when this question inevitably reaches the U.S. Supreme Court.
There plaintiffs successfully defend a jury verdict totaling $204,000 in a Title VII, Equal Pay Act and Iowa Civil Rights Act case, plus $269,877.67 in attorney's fees. The court casts doubt on the use of a "market forces" defense by employers to justify lower pay for women, yet also holds that if such a defense were valid, the employer presented insufficient evidence to warrant an instruction.