Here's a valuable case for employees suffering harassment (and lawyers who bring such cases). The First Circuit reverses summary judgment for age-based and retaliatory hostile work environment, holding that the district court put the plaintiff to an impossible standard of specificity to prove individual incidents of harassment. It also holds that repeated threats of termination can constitute constructive discharge.
The Third Circuit, declaring a split with several other courts, holds that an ADEA disparate-impact case may allege discrimination against a subset of the protected group, here employees 50 and over. Prior decisions had held that such claims could be based only on the entire protected group - age 40 and over - but the Third Circuit panel holds that "their reasoning relies primarily on policy arguments that we do not find persuasive."
Here's another case involving a joint-employer relationship between a staffing agency and one of its clients. The Fifth Circuit reverses summary judgment, holding that There was a genuine dispute about whether the staffing agency should have known that the client asked it to reassign an employee for age-biased reasons.
Sometimes state law and state courts provide advantages over a federal forum. Exhibit A: today's 5-2 decision from the Missouri Supreme Court, remanding an age-discrimination case for a new trial owing to evidentiary and discovery errors, particularly exclusion of evidence of discrimination against There, older coworkers and denial of a deposition of the chairman and CEO.
A long-running disparate impact case challenging promotions of firefighters to the ranks of Lieutenant and Captain is remanded by the Sixth Circuit for a third trial to award back pay, and the panel reassigns the case to a new judge for good measure. The panel has valuable things to say about how to calculate monetary make-whole relief. It also affirms injunctive relief, and appointment of a monitor, to purge the city's violation.
Even imperfect employees, we are reminded, are protected by anti-discrimination laws. The First Circuit holds that the district court too quickly credited the employer's reliance on the plaintiff's disciplinary history when it fired him, without looking behind the record to see if the hotel genuinely believed that the offenses were serious enough to warrant termination.
The Eighth Circuit reverses summary judgment in this ADEA and Minnesota Human Rights Act case, holding that a jury could find that the city's failure to promote the city's lieutenant to Chief of Police was motivated by age. Importantly, it notes that an employer that assumes that people who are retirement-eligible are "uncommitted" to a promotion are skating on thin-ice.
Over the long holiday weekend, the Fifth Circuit issued the first EEO case of the year, one that points up an important federal pleading lesson in the era of Iqbal and Twombly. To wit, if you anticipate seeking a default judgment, make sure that your discrimination complaint is as complete as possible. The Fifth Circuit holds (2-1), in a matter of first impression, that deficiencies in a complaint cannot be cured by live testimony in a default judgment hearing. The court concludes, in the present case, that while the plaintiff presented a plausible case of age discrimination at the hearing, the complaint itself was insufficient to support the judgment.
The Eighth Circuit, en banc (9-3), today affirms summary judgment in an ADEA case. The surprise is not so much in the outcome as the vote split, which is not along ordinary lines. In second case, a panel reverses (in part) summary judgment on another ADEA claim, finding that pointed inquiries into an employee's Medicare eligibility and health-plan costs were probative evidence of age bias.
Courts sometimes get confused about who, in our American system of civil justice, gets to decide whether an adverse employment decision was taken because of the employee's age. That decision belongs to a jury. So even if the employer might have had a very good and non-discriminatory reason for eliminating a position, when the principal decision maker also tells the terminated employee that "you didn't come here to work, you came here to retire," it is the jury - not the judge - that is allowed to decide whether it's age discrimination.