The Second Circuit analyzes a claim that an ADEA plaintiff was "constructively discharged," that is, compelled to retire or resign against their will. The panel holds that a threat of imminent termination for supposedly stealing a canister of poppin' fresh biscuits was enough to support such a claim.
The Second Circuit reminds courts that it is not necessary for a Title VII harassment plaintiff to prove specifically that there was physical contact, that their work performance suffered, or that they were personally targeted for harassment to prove that there was a "severe or pervasive" hostile work environment.
Here's another case of a judge not thinking like a juror: most fair-minded people would consider it evidence of pregnancy discrimination that a manager launched an audit and started putting negative reports in an employee's file literally days after she announced her pregnancy. The district court judge did not get this, but the Second Circuit reverses and sends the case back for trial. The panel also addresses the standard for proving sex discrimination in pay under Title VII, outside of the "equal work" framework.
The Second Circuit holds that even though the plaintiff (in an ADA associational discrimination case) also plead the employer's supposedly "legitimate, non-discriminatory" reasons for termination in his complaint, the district court erred in weighing them while deciding a motion to dismiss.
Although it is a commonplace that employers do not violate Title VII simply by shortcutting their own internal disciplinary systems, that is not necessarily the case if the disciplinary proceeding itself is motivated in part by gender or racial stereotypes. Today, the Second Circuit holds that a coach stated a plausible claim that his employer relied on "invidious stereotypes and credit[ed] malicious accusations" while investigating a Title IX harassment complaint filed against him by a student.
The Second Circuit, in an ADEA hostile work environment and retaliation case, reminds district court judges that they are not to weigh or evaluate credibility of evidence submitted on summary judgment. Among other things, the district court forgot that "[i]t was required to disregard the contrary statements from [defendant's witnesses] that a jury would not be required to believe."
This week, two U.S. Courts of Appeals publish decisions about whether religiously-oriented employers were exempt from Title VII owing to alleged religious-liberty rights: a Methodist hospital wins in the Second Circuit, while a funeral home loses in the Sixth Circuit.
The Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) provides that eligible employees may be entitled to leave to care for relatives with whom they had an in loco parentis relationship as a child. The Second Circuit holds that where the plaintiff requested leave to care for a sick grandparent, who raised him has a child, the employer had a duty to inquire further about the relationship before denying leave.
Today's Two-fer Tuesday in the Second Circuit: a pregnancy discrimination case is returned for retrial, in light of the intervening decision in Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015); and a panel holds that a state human-resource professional's opposition to changes in the EEO complaint-reporting procedures is not a "protected activity" under Title VII.